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Farm Real Estate Prices Still Rising in Minnesota
Steven J. Taff
Average Minnesota farm real estate
sales prices just keep on climbing
(figure 1). This despite low output
prices, rising input costs, and continued
uncertainty about the future of federal
subsidies. Sales price increases were
seen in all parts of the state except in the
northwest.
In this annual sales price summary, I
can provide only an overview, some cur-
sory analysis, and—as always—a few
opinions. I’ll not bore you with text that
simply repeats what’s already shown in
the charts. Instead I’ll spend some time
discussing how land transaction data are
recorded, adjusted, and employed.
I think it’s useful to go through some
administrative and procedural details to
further our understanding of what these
data are and what they are not. If this
prospect makes you say, “Just show me
the data, Steve,” then you can stop right
after the sales summary section. Or, if
your impatience knows no bounds, go
straight to the Minnesota Land Econom-
ics (MLE) Web site at http:/
apec.umn.edu/landeconomics and start
working the numbers yourself.
Farm Land Sales in 2000
Assessors are required to report
initial assessments in late fall, based on
sales data to date. That’s why the data
are reported on a “record year” basis:
these are the sales that were, presumably,
available for assessor scrutiny at the time
the initial estimated market-values are
calculated. Final values are set by sum-
mer, to be used in the succeeding tax
year. So, for example, sales made in late
1999 are used by assessors to set initial
values for January 2001. These estimates
are adjusted in spring 2001, finalized in
summer 2001, and then used for tax
How Clean Is Clean Enough?
Stephen Polasky
On Election Day, November 7,
2000, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral
arguments on two related cases pitting
industry groups against the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) over
new air quality standards issued in 1997.
Though air quality standards have been
overshadowed by other legal and politi-
cal news lately, the air quality standards
cases are quite significant and raise a
host of important economic, legal, and
policy issues. Should the government
consider how costly it might be to attain
air quality standards when it sets the
standards? Or should the government
only consider factors related to protect-
ing the public health? And how much
discretion and latitude should a govern-
ment agency have in deciding how
stringent environmental standards should
be?
The final Supreme Court decision,
announced a few months ago, could have
far-reaching impacts, not just on air
quality, but on all federal environmental,
health, and safety regulations.
Air Quality Regulation
The Clean Air Act authorizes the
EPA to set National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for certain pollutants including
! ozone (smog), which is associated
with respiratory difficulties and
diseases and, possibly, with prema-
ture death; and
! particulate matter (soot), which is
linked to respiratory diseases and
premature death.
The Act mandates the EPA to set air
quality standards “requisite to protect the
public health with an adequate margin of
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purposes in 2002. The adjusted record
year 2000 sales data were therefore not
available until April of this year.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of all
farmland sales in 2000. The bulk of the
sales lie between $500 and $2,000 per
acre. I excluded a small number of sales
that exceeded $5,000 per acre as well as
those involving parcels of land less than
20 acres in size. Both were excluded as
not being plausibly “agricultural”—de-
spite their designation on the Certificate
of Real Estate Value (CRV) as “agricul-
tural” land. (Although excluded from
figure 2, these data are included in the
MLE Web site data.)
Even though MAE readers and MLE
Web site users can view the full distribu-
tion of sales prices, most still ask for a
single number that somehow captures the
story behind the figures. Obviously, for a
set of sales that span such a wide range
in prices, any single number fails com-
pletely to accomplish this end. Move-
ments in averages, while arithmetically
correct, usually fail to tell the entire
story.
The particular average I use in this
article is a location- and size-weighted
mean (table 1). In last year’s farm real
estate report (http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/
mn/mae699.pdf), I discussed the useful-
ness of such weighting as well as the
desirability of examining sales data at the
smallest geographic scale possible.
Figure 1 compares the movements
of actual sales price averages with those
two other estimates of land value—the
United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) annual state estimates (based on
a farmer opinion survey) and the average
assessor estimates (the location- and
size-weighted mean estimated market
value). The University of Minnesota
sales prices averages are location- and
size-weighted means.
The fact that all three (somewhat)
independent estimates of farmland real
estate values shown in figure 1 move in
lockstep adds credence, I believe, to the
conclusion that, on average, farmland
values really are increasing in
Minnesota.
Geographic variations in real estate
values for the past 11 years are shown in
the box-and-whisker plots of figure 3.
(District boundaries are shown in
figure 4.)
The range of sales prices for each
district for each year is shown by the
endpoints of the vertical lines. The ends
of each box show the prices at which 25
percent of the sales were higher (or
lower). The median is indicated by the
horizontal bar within each box. So, for
example, the median Central district
farmland sale was about $1,200 per acre,
with 25 percent of the sales lower than
$750 and 75 percent lower than $1,850
per acre.
In previous years’ reports, I’ve noted
the wide variation in average price
movements among districts. Such differ-
ences were accentuated in 2000 by the
continued climb of values in the South
East district combined with the continued
stagnation in the North West district
(figure 5).
Farm Sale Data
When a Minnesota property is sold,
the transaction details must be recorded
at the county courthouse on a form called
a CRV. On it, the seller attests that such-
and-such a property was sold to
so-and-so on a certain date for a specific
price. Other information about the prop-
erty (its size, soil characteristics, prior
year’s estimated market value) is often
entered on the CRV as well.
Frequently, the per-acre prices that
underlie this article and are also shown
in the MLE Web site are not the prices
entered on the CRV. Long before a land
sales figure enters the official data base,
it has been passed through an array of
filters and adjustments designed to make
comparison among transactions more
meaningful and more reliable.
Recording the Transactions
There are many possible slips be-
tween an ownership change and data
analysis. Of course, there is always the
chance that simple recording errors are
made. For example, numbers may be
miscopied from bills of sale onto the
CRV, or into a computer file, or into a
spreadsheet.
There is also a chance of misrepre-
sentation. The person who fills in the
CRV might have a reason to understate
or overstate the actual sales price—per-
haps to avoid a tax. This, of course, is
illegal, but, as any courthouse veteran
can tell you, it occasionally happens.
Not every sale receives further pro-
cessing. Local or state officials remove
from subsequent analysis any sale not
deemed “arms-length,” because it was
sold, for example, to a member of the
seller’s immediate family. Or, a sale
might be pulled because the new buyer
intends to convert the land to a non-agri-
cultural use.
Adjusting the Prices
After this filtering, sales prices are
frequently adjusted to make comparison
among sales more appropriate.
First, to expunge the effects of infla-
tion, sales prices are deflated by an
officially reported rate to January 2 of
the year in which they were recorded.
This “adjustment for time” is fairly mi-
nor in years (like the past decade) where
inflation has been low.
The second adjustment is “for
terms.” Not all farm real estate sales are
for the full property. Some are made
through a contract for deed, an arrange-
ment that allows the buyer to pay a
certain amount now and other amounts at
stated intervals. Until the final payment
is made, the property remains in the pos-
session of the seller—even though it has
been “sold.” Because the full payment
schedule is entered on the CRV, the De-
partment of Revenue can calculate a
present value of the initial and subse-
quent payments at an official discount
rate. This becomes the official sales price
of the property, regardless of what the
buyer and seller had in mind when they
sealed the deal.
Adjustments don’t end with a time-
and terms-adjusted sales price, honestly
reported and accurately recorded. In
most cases, users of the data are inter-
ested in per-acre prices, not per-parcel
prices. That means some chosen total
price must be divided by some total acre-
age. But which price? Which acres?
Should we use the total price or should
we first subtract out the value of build-
ings, personal property, ancillary
property, or machinery to get closer to
the “true” land price?
In this article (and on the MLE Web
site), I choose to follow conventions
established years ago in Minnesota. I
report the time- and terms-adjusted total
sales price, minus the value of personal
property, divided by the entire acreage of
the parcel. That’s why, when I’m being
careful, I speak of the average price of
farm real estate, not of farm land.3
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Figure 2. Minnesota farm real estate sales prices and estimated values in 2000
Table 1. Minnesota farm real estate sales summary
Employing the Data
The sales reported here are only
those recorded between October 1, 1999,
and September 30, 2000. These “record
year 2000” sales are so bundled because
of the way real estate transactions are
used to help local assessors value land
for property tax purposes.
Strange as it may seem, the Depart-
ment of Revenue does not collect sales
data merely to satisfy the data cravings
of University economists like me. No,
statewide sales data are collected princi-
pally to create statistics that are used to
“equalize” property tax valuations across
county boundaries.
Each year, county assessors are re-
quired to assign an estimated market
value (EMV) to each of the thousands of
real estate parcels in the county. The
estimate is supposed to be based on an
examination of similar properties that
were actually sold recently. (The com-
bined valuations for each township, city,
or county are the source of the Land
Values—in contrast to the Farmland
Sales—data on the MLE Web site.)
Because every county has its own
assessor who uses largely independent
valuation procedures, there are inevitably
discontinuities across county lines—even
for adjacent properties. Farmer Brown
wonders why Farmer Olson’s land, just
across the fence line in the next county,
carries an assessed value that is lower by
$200 per acre.
The state has created an equalization
procedure that is supposed to smooth
over such discontinuities. Assuming that
nearby properties really would sell for
similar prices, any observed difference in
assessed values for otherwise similar
properties is presumed to be evidence
that one or both of the assessors is either
undervaluing (that is, assigning an EMV
that is too low) or overvaluing
properties.
To test this, the state calculates a
sales ratio (the EMV divided by sales
price) for every property sold in a par-
ticular area. If an assessor systematically
undervalues properties (shown by sales
ratios that are consistently lower than
some threshold), the state might demand
the EMVs in that jurisdiction be uni-
formly raised, to better accord with what
is thought to be “true” market conditions.
How Accurate Are the EMVs?
We can see for ourselves how close
the final assessor estimates are by com-
paring actual sales prices against the
previous year’s estimated market values
for the same property (figure 2). Each
point in the figure represents one sale.
For example, the rightmost point is for a
property that was estimated to have a
value of $4,900 per acre, but actually
sold for only $2,900 per acre. While
some of the estimates are obviously way
off (like this example), the bulk are
pretty close. In most cases, the EMV was
lower than the sale price, but in a neatly
predictable manner. A simple one-vari-
able regression model, shown as the
straight line in the figure, accounts for
nearly 75 percent of the observed varia-
tion in farm real estate sales prices.
Parting Thoughts
What accounts for the ever-onward-
and-upward movement of average farm
real estate prices in Minnesota? We need
only to round up the usual suspects, most
of which I have discussed at length in
previous issues of MAE. These include
1) perennial farmer optimism about fu-
ture crop and livestock prices, 2)
expected extensions of federal farm sub-
sidy programs, 3) continued favorable
local property tax treatment for farmland,
4) the desire of some farmers to increase
the size of their current operation by
buying adjacent farmland, 5) the desire
of some non-farm buyers to use land as a
hedge against inflation, and 6) inflation
itself.
An additional suspect that we need
to add is the increasing prominence of
location even in rural land markets. We
simply can’t explain current price levels
on the basis of income potential (includ-
ing subsidies) and speculation potential
alone. Clearly, where the land sits with
respect to job centers and what it looks
like is influencing the price buyers are
willing to pay for a particular parcel of
land.
Record year Number of sales Acres sold Average price*
1996 2,504 263,728 936
1997 2,641 296,803 1,039
1998 2,724 303,968 1,113
1999 2,212 235,359 1,196
2000 2,258 250,979 1,222
* Location- and size-weighted per-acre mean
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4. Farm real estate sales districts
As always, I caution potential land
buyers and sellers about reading too
much into the average land prices re-
ported here and elsewhere. If you’ve got
land to sell or if you have a hankering to
buy land—look before you leap. The
financial stakes are too high for casual
empiricism. Hire an appraiser. Talk with
your spouse. Check your finances. Think
about the children. Be careful out there!
Steven J. Taff is an associate professor
and extension economist with the
Department of Applied Economics at the
University of Minnesota.
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basis for how the EPA is to set air quality
standards. Though the words seem rela-
tively clear, there have been extensive
arguments over their precise meaning.
The EPA has interpreted them to mean
that it is public health considerations
alone, without considerations of cost,
that dictate the stringency of air quality
standards. Most lower court rulings sup-
ported this interpretation of the Act.
Once the EPA sets air quality stan-
dards, each state must then implement its
own controls on emission sources so that
the national air quality standards are met.
At this implementation stage, unlike the
standards-setting stage, considerations of
cost and technological feasibility may be
considered. In particular, a state can con-
sider the relative costs of reducing
emissions from different sources. From a
strict standpoint of economic efficiency,
it is better to obtain emissions reductions
from the sources where it is cheapest to
do so. The same level of environmental
quality is thereby obtained at lower cost.
As a result, the current air quality regula-
tory environment is designed to, in
theory at least, permit some efficiencies.
A Safe Level of Pollution?
The Clean Air Act establishes the
laudable goal of protecting public health
with an adequate margin of safety. Who
could be against protecting the public
health? But what does such a goal mean
in practical terms for air-pollution stan-
dards, and is it achievable?
Deciding What Is Unacceptable
It would be wonderful if there were
such a thing as a level of air quality that
everybody agreed was “safe.” It would
be comforting to think that the EPA can
set “safe” air quality standards and pro-
tect us all from the adverse health
consequences of air pollution. This nice
vision, however, is just a vision. Setting
precisely and scientifically justified
“safe” levels for many air pollutants is
still a dream.
For most air pollutants—ozone and
particulate matter included—breathing
less pollution is certainly better than
breathing more of it. But for some pollut-
ants there is a possibility of adverse
health consequences at any level of ex-
posure. These pollutants are called
“non-threshold pollutants” because there
is no level (threshold) below which ad-
verse health effects have been shown not
to occur. There is no “safe” and “unsafe”
level of exposure to non-threshold pol-
lutants; there is only “better” and
“worse.” Science can help us measure
pollution, but only politics can help us
decide how much or how little is accept-
able. Congress, however, has chosen not
to make this political judgment; rather, it
has told the EPA to decide what level of
pollution is unacceptable.
If there are potential threats to pub-
lic health from even minimal levels of
pollution, does the Clean Air Act require
the EPA to set standards that eliminate
pollution entirely? Hopefully not, be-
cause getting to zero emissions would
mean shutting down virtually the entire
economy. That, surely, is not what Con-
gress intended when it wrote the Clean
Air Act. No one has advocated the total
elimination of emissions. Even environ-
mental groups shy away from pushing
such an extreme outcome because they
realize it would almost surely cause Con-
gress to revise the Clean Air Act.
Stricter Rules
The accumulation of new scientific
information, however, may change the
received wisdom on the links between air
pollution and public health. When such
new information changes the level of air
quality thought to be “requisite to protect
public health,” the EPA must reevaluate
air quality standards. Thus, in 1997, cit-
ing new scientific information on the
dangers of air pollution to public health,
the EPA issued new stricter air quality
standards for ozone and particulate
matter.
The new ozone and particulate mat-
ter air quality standards therefore
resulted in new stricter state regulations
on point sources such as electric power-
generating plants and industrial plants, as
well as on automobiles and trucks.
Challenges to the New Rules
Most environmental groups were
pleased with the new air quality stan-
dards. Many industry groups, however,
were not. After losing the fight during the
Clinton administration over the strin-
gency of the new standards, several
industry groups turned to the courts for
relief. In May 1999, the U.S. Appeals
Court for the D.C. Circuit issued a ruling
favorable to the industry position. The
court held that the imposition of the new
standards represented an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to an
agency of the executive branch. In a
different part of the same ruling, the Ap-
peals Court held that the EPA was
correct in not considering the cost of
attainment when deciding how stringent
to make air quality standards.
The Appeals Court agreed with in-
dustry groups that the EPA, because it
appeared to have the discretion to set the
standard anywhere “between zero and a
hair below…London’s Killer fog,” was
not just administering the law but, in an
important sense, was creating the law
and usurping the role of Congress. In
most cases, courts defer to agencies on
how statutes should be interpreted, rea-
soning that Congress has delegated that
power to the agency.
The EPA appealed the non-delega-
tion decision to the U.S. Supreme Court,
and, at the same time, some industry
groups petitioned the Court to consider
the argument that the EPA must consider
the costs of attaining the standards when
setting air quality standards. The Su-
preme Court agreed to hear both cases.
The Arguments
In the Supreme Court case, the EPA
argued that it does not need to regulate
emissions to zero. Just because a poten-
tial risk exists does not mean it
represents an actual risk to public health.
Further, some risks are small or tempo-
rary and do not rise to the level of
causing adverse consequences to public
health.
The difficulty for the EPA in this
line of argument, however, is that it must
make value judgements about how much
evidence is needed before it can establish
enough of a link to justify action. Fur-
ther, a value judgement is required about
just how large or permanent an effect
must be before the EPA will consider it
detrimental to public health. Are there
any grounds for coming up with defini-
tive criteria for saying why a few cases
of disease are acceptable but a few more
are unacceptable?
It was on this point, the basis for
how the EPA chose the stringency of the
new air quality standards, that the Ap-
peals Court had such difficulty. The
Appeals Court decision said that neither
the Clean Air Act nor the EPA provided
an “intelligible principle” on which to7
base the standards:
[In the Clean Air Act, it seems as
though] Congress commanded EPA
to select “big guys,” and EPA an-
nounced that it would evaluate
candidates based on height and
weight, but revealed no cut-off
point. The announcement, though
sensible in what it does say, is fa-
tally incomplete. The reasonable
person responds, “How tall? How
heavy?”
The Appeals Court, in effect, was
asking the EPA to specify in clear terms
exactly how it decides “how safe is safe
enough?”
The industry groups aligned against
the EPA argued that the way to establish
an “intelligible principle” is to weigh the
economic cost of attaining an air quality
standard against the economic benefits
gained by improving the public’s health.
Using a cost-benefit approach, standards
should be tightened if, and only if, the
benefits of further improvements in air
quality equal or exceed the costs of at-
taining the standards. Policy economists
have long endorsed using cost-benefit
analyses to make rational public-policy
decisions. In fact, all recent administra-
tions have required that a cost-benefit
analysis be done when new regulations
were under consideration. Unfortunately,
no administration has yet mandated that
public-policy decisions should actually
be based on such analyses.
Using Cost-Benefit Analyses
A cost-benefit approach for setting
air quality standards faces several signifi-
cant practical as well as legal difficulties.
Actually measuring the economic costs
and benefits of cleaner air is problematic.
The lion’s share of the benefits of air
quality improvement is associated with
reductions in respiratory disease and
premature death. Estimating such bene-
fits requires two pieces of information.
First, there must be a way to estimate
how many premature deaths or cases of
disease would be avoided with a reduc-
tion in air pollution, something for which
our current scientific understanding and
data are woefully inadequate. Second,
there must be a way to place a dollar
value on reduced disease and premature
death.
Several economic studies have esti-
mated the value people place on
reducing their chances of suffering pol-
lutant-induced disease or death. Natu-
rally, some people are horrified by the
whole idea of trying to estimate the dol-
lar value of life and health. As a result,
the values given in different studies vary
widely. On the cost side, air quality stan-
dards are often meant to be “technology
forcing,” which means the new standards
should spur the development of new
pollution-control technology capable of
meeting the standards. However, it is
often difficult to estimate how much it
will cost to develop this new
technology.
The Supreme Court Decision
In late February 2001, the Supreme
Court unanimously ruled that the EPA
could not consider economic costs in its
air quality rule-making. Congress, the
Court held, was so explicit about this that
no wiggle-room is permitted. This deci-
sion, however, doesn’t make the EPA’s
work any easier.
No new air quality standard can be
“arbitrary and capricious.” There must be
good reasons for setting a particular stan-
dard at a given level and for not setting it
higher or lower. Assuming that costs will
not be considered, it is hard to see how
any standard for a non-threshold pollut-
ant can stand up in court against an
allegation that it is “arbitrary and capri-
cious.” The only exception may be a
zero-risk standard, but using a zero-risk
standard would impose intolerable costs
on society.
Any time risks are greater than zero,
the EPA cannot claim that there are no
adverse health consequences from air
pollution. What principle, then, allows
the EPA to draw a line and say that some
risks are acceptable but others are not?
For non-threshold pollutants, Congress—
and now the Supreme Court—has given
the EPA an impossible task.
There are only two ways out of this
dilemma. There must either be some
explicit recognition that a certain level of
risk is tolerable, or there must be a con-
sideration of the tradeoffs between the
costs of attainment and the benefits of
cleaner air. In addition, the EPA (or Con-
gress) needs to spell out some clear
criteria for setting standards based on
how much risk is tolerable, and the
courts must agree that such criteria are
not “arbitrary and capricious.”
Most people who think for any
length of time about environmental
policy come to realize that we can’t have
it all: a perfectly clean environment and
unimpeded industrial activity are mutu-
ally incompatible. If you drive a car to
work, you contribute to pollution. If you
heat your house in winter or cool it in
summer, you contribute to pollution.
Tradeoffs, however, can be made, and it
seems inevitable that enlightened public
policy will have to confront these
tradeoffs when setting new air quality
standards.
In the political debate over environ-
mental standards, the argument to weigh
the costs against the benefits is often
used by those who want to weaken envi-
ronmental regulations. There is no
logical link, however, between an ex-
plicit consideration of costs and benefits
and weaker environmental protection. In
fact, studies by the EPA have shown that
regulation under the Clean Air Act has
yielded far more economic benefits than
it has imposed costs since 1970. Decid-
ing what is best will inevitably involve
difficult value judgements about the rela-
tive importance of various factors.
Reasonable people may disagree about
where to set a particular standard. But a
standard will be far more defensible if
there is a clear and explicit consideration
of all of the important consequences of
deciding exactly “how clean is clean
enough.”
Stephen Polasky is a professor in the
Department of Applied Economics at the
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